




THE ORIGINS OF THE RECENT NEW APPROACH  
TO DETERMINING WRONGFULNESS IN THE  
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF DELICT∗ 
OPSOMMING 
Die oorsprong van die onlangse nuwe benadering tot onregmatigheidsbepaling  
in die Suid-Afrikaanse deliktereg 
Die onlangse nuwe benadering om onregmatigheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse deliktereg te 
bepaal, voortvloeiend uit Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising 
Standards Authority SA 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 468, is dat onregmatigheid teenwoordig is 
wanneer dit volgens beleidsoorwegings of openbare beleid, redelik sal wees om  persoon 
aanspreeklik te hou. Na Telematrix het die howe hierdie benadering uitgebrei deur te ver-
klaar dat onregmatigheid handel oor die redelikheid van die oplegging van aanspreek-
likheid vir  nalatige handeling of  handeling wat veronderstel word om nalatig te wees. 
Navorsing oor die Engelse tort law het aan die lig gebring dat die Engelse reg die 
oorsprong van hierdie onlangse benadering is. Die onlangse benadering wat gebruik word 
om onregmatigheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg te bepaal is merkwaardig soortgelyk aan  
toets wat gebruik word om  duty of care in die tort of negligence van die Engelse reg te 
bepaal. Die Suid-Afrikaanse deliktereg verskil fundamenteel van die Engelse law of torts 
in soverre die Suid-Afrikaanse reg  generaliserende benadering tot die bepaling van 
deliktuele aanspreeklikheid volg, terwyl die Engelse reg  verskeidenheid van verskil-
lende torts, elk met sy eie vereistes, erken. Ons howe moet baie omsigtig met die 
moontlike implikasies omgaan en moet veral waak om nie die tort of negligence heelhuids 
oor te neem nie. Wanneer toetse en beginsels by die Engelse reg geleen word, moet ons 
versigtig wees om nie toetse en beginsels te aanvaar wat nie inpas by of kenmerkend is 
van ons generaliserende benadering nie. 
1 Introduction 
Much has been written about the “new test” or “new variation” of the test for 
wrongfulness in determining delictual liability in South African law (see Scott 
“Loureiro and Others v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 3 SA 394 
(SCA): Determination of constitutional nature of contractual and delictual 
claims” 2014 De Jure 388; Neethling and Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 80–87). 
Upon researching English tort law it has become apparent that the origin of this 
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“new” test or “new variation” of the test (referred to as the “recent approach” 
from here on) is in all probability derived from English tort law and more 
specifically from the test applied in determining a “duty of care” with regard to 
the tort of negligence. The South African courts, in applying this recent 
approach, are in fact drawing closer to adopting English law and the tort of 
negligence.  
In this note, the recent approach, the test applied to determining wrongfulness 
before this recent approach (referred to as the “traditional approach” from here 
on) and fundamental similarities and differences between the South African law 
of delict and English tort law are referred to briefly. The English test for 
determining a duty of care is discussed and compared with the recent approach to 
determining wrongfulness in South African law. A conclusion follows with a 
summary of the submissions made. 
2 The traditional and recent approach to determining wrongfulness in 
South African law 
The traditional approach to determining wrongfulness emanated from the 
decision of Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 596–597 where it 
was held that in order for conduct to be deemed wrongful, the harm suffered 
must be caused in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable manner, contra bonos 
mores, in light of all surrounding circumstances (see further Minister of Law and 
Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 317–318; Knop v Johannesburg City Council 
1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; Administrateur, Transvaal v Van der Merwe 1994 4 SA 347 
(A) 361; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Basdeo 1996 1 SA 355 
(A) 367; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 1 SA 489 (SCA) 
494; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 36 fn 19–21). In determining wrongfulness, 
the basic question is whether a legally recognised interest was infringed and if so 
whether it was infringed in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable manner (see 
Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 
SA 475 (A) 498–499; Premier Western Cape v Faircape Property Developers 
(Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 13 (SCA) 31–32; Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 
2 SA 1 (A) 27; Neethling and Potgieter “Wrongfulness and legal causation as 
separate elements of a delict: Confusion reigns: eBotswana (Pty) Ltd v Sentech 
(Pty) Ltd 2013 6 SA 327 (GSJ); Cape Empowerment Trust Limited v Fisher 
Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 183 (SCA)” 2014 TSAR 890; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 33; Loubser and Midgley (eds) The law of delict in South Africa 
(2012) 142 146). The criterion used to determine whether a legally recognised 
interest was infringed in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable manner is the 
boni mores yardstick (see Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 596–
597; Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; Carmichele v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2001 1 SA 489 (SCA) 494; Moses v Minister of 
Safety and Security 2000 3 SA 106 (C) 113; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and 
Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 
395; Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 317–318; F v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 SA 536 (CC) 566; Paixão v Road 
Accident Fund 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) 381; Lee v Minister of Correctional 
Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 149 167; Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, 
Department of Infrastructure Development 2014 2 SA 214 (SCA) 222; Neethling 
and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 890; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 36 fn 21–22; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 142 144; Van der Walt and Midgley 
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Principles of delict (2016) 113–114). The boni mores yardstick is an objective 
test based on the criterion of reasonableness and the courts have an obligation to 
develop the boni mores in order to ensure that it is in line with the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights (Neethling and Potgieter Delict 39–40). The 
boni mores is thus a flexible, open-ended, juridical yardstick that gives 
expression to the evolving convictions of the South African community allowing 
the courts to continuously adapt the law and provide value judgements (see Van 
Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 396, 400; 
Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 442; 
Deneys Reitz v SA Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union 1991 2 SA 
685 (W) 693; Marais v Richard 1981 1 SA 1157 (A) 1168; Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 593; National 
Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1212; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 40 fn 41). The courts may be faced with two or more competing interests 
which the plaintiff and defendant rely on and which require protection of the law 
(see Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 
579 (A) 585; National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA); H v W 2013 
5 BCLR 554 (GSJ); Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 141 145). In such 
instances the courts must weigh the different interests and decide according to 
the particular circumstances of the case whether the infringement of the 
plaintiff’s interests was reasonable or not (see Oosthuizen v Van Heerden 2014 6 
SA 423 (GP) 434–435; Natal Fresh Produce Growers’ Association v Agroserve 
(Pty) Ltd 1990 4 SA 749 (N) 753–754; Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 
140; other cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 38 fn 27; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 145; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 110, 187–189; 
Burchell Principles of delict (1993) 38). 
In practice, wrongfulness can be determined more precisely by making use of 
either of the two well-known practical applications of the basic test for 
wrongfulness, that is, by either establishing whether there was an infringement of 
a right, or breach of a legal duty to prevent harm. In this sense the boni mores 
test is seen as a supplementary test and is used in three types of scenarios. 
(1) In unique situations where there is no distinct violation of a legal standard 
or ground of justification applicable, such as in instances of omissions, or 
pure economic loss. In instances of ommission, the question asked is 
whether there was a legal duty on the defendant to prevent the harm or loss; 
that is, taking all surrounding circumstances into account, would the 
community regard the omission as wrongful? 
(2) In establishing wrongfulness in borderline and novel cases, for example, 
where there is uncertainty whether the defendant’s conduct exceeded the 
bounds of a ground of justification (see Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie 
Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376, 383 (T); Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 
SA 135 (WCC) 140–141; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 45–58; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 71 105 113–116; Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 146–148; Burchell Delict 39). 
(3) The application of a ground of justification. The boni mores would condone 
the prima facie infringement of interests or breach of a legal duty based on 
the criterion of reasonableness. In actual fact, the defendant exercises his 
own lawful rights and the plaintiff’s rights are thereby limited by the 
defendant’s exercise of his rights. Proof of a ground of justification 
illustrates reasonableness of conduct and the defendant’s conduct may not 
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be found wrongful (see Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 101 190; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 162–163; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 88). 
The option of which route to take in determining wrongfulness, will depend on 
the facts of the case. In some instances it may be easier to identify the right 
infringed while in others, a legal duty to prevent harm or loss may be more easily 
established. Causing of physical harm by a commission or infringement of an 
interest may be considered prima facie wrongful. However, not all factual 
infringements of interests are prima facie wrongful and it is possible that a 
ground of justification may still be applicable (see Universiteit van Pretoria v 
Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T) 387; Lillicrap, Wassenaar 
and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A) 497; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 45 fn 69 46; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 
146). 
The recent approach stemming from Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle 
Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 468 
(“Telematrix”) is that wrongfulness is present when according to policy con-
siderations or public policy, it would be reasonable to hold a person liable, or 
that wrongfulness turns on “the reasonableness of imposing liability for conduct 
that has been shown, or is assumed to be, negligent” (see Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 80; Fagan “Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict” 2005 SALJ 93; 
Fagan “Blind faith: A response to Professors Neethling and Potgieter” SALJ 
2007 292; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 140; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 99). The recent approach, to my mind, as far as can be ascertained, began 
with the views of Du Bois (“Getting wrongfulness right: A Ciceronian attempt” 
2000 Acta Juridica 1ff), was adapted by Fagan (2005 SALJ 106–115), was 
adopted by Harms JA in Telematrix (468) and Brand JA (“Reflections on 
wrongfulness in the law of delict” 2007 SALJ 79, see some of the following 
decisions in which Brand JA presided over: Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) 
315; Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Develop-
ment 2014 2 SA 214 (SCA) 223; Cape Empowerment Trust Limited v Fisher 
Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 183 (SCA) 193; Roux v Hattingh 2012 6 SA 428 
(SCA) 439; RH v DE 2015 5 SA 83 (CC) [18]; iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) 
Ltd v Loureiro 2013 3 SA 407 (SCA) 424–425; Lee v Minister of Correctional 
Services 2013 2 SA 144 (CC) 173; F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 
SA 536 (CC) 567–568; Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd v GC Pale t/a Invasive Plant 
Solutions 2012 1 SA 615(GSJ) 622; Jacobs v Chairman, Governing Body, 
Rhodes High School 2011 1 SA 160 (WCC) 165. See also Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 80 fn 308) and then recently endorsed by the courts (see cases 
referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 78 fn 276–280 where this recent 
approach was followed; cf Fagan 2007 SALJ 287). 
This recent approach was severely and justifiably criticised for inter alia: 
attaining superiority as the central element in determining delictual liability; 
causing conflation between the elements of wrongfulness, negligence and legal 
causation; for wrongfulness being established after all the other elements are 
established; for conforming to an Anglo-American approach where there are 
separate torts instead of the generalising approach followed in South Africa law; 
for the English duty of care concept being equated with the South African legal 
duty to prevent harm or loss; for the reference to the legal duty to prevent harm 
or loss as a legal duty not to act negligently; and for the approach being 
incomplete, under-developed and rather vague (see Neethling and Potgieter 
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Delict 80–87 158–160; Knobel “Thoughts on the functions and application of the 
elements of a delict” 2008 THRHR 652–653; Scott “Mpongwana v Minister of 
Safety and Security 1999 2 SA 795 (C): Delictual liability for omission” 1999 De 
Jure 342, Scott “Railroad operator’s failure to protect passenger against attack 
on train not negligent: Shabalala v Metrorail 2008 3 SA 142 (SCA)” 2009 
THRHR 158–163; Scott “Delictual liability for adultery: A healthy remedy’s 
road to perdition” in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of 
Johann Neethling (2015) 433). 
3 Fundamental similarities and differences between the South African law 
of delict and English tort law 
The South African law of delict follows a general approach, in that generally all 
the elements of a delict must be present before liability will ensue in any given 
case of a civil wrong. In other words, where required, conduct, wrongfulness, 
fault, causation and harm must be present before liability will ensue (except in 
cases of strict liability where fault is not required or where an interdict is sought: 
see Perlman v Zoutendyk 1934 CPD 151 155; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 4; 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 9 39; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 16). In 
comparison, English law follows a “casuistic approach” where there are approx-
imately seventy torts each with its own specific requirements. The main tort is 
the tort of negligence and there are a number of intentional torts. Therefore in 
English law, liability will ensue only when the specific requirements for that 
specific tort (civil wrong) have been met (see Koziol in Koziol (ed) Basic 
questions of tort law from a comparative perspective (2015) 697).  
What is essentially common to tort law and the law of delict is that where 
some harm or loss is suffered by the claimant as a result of infringements of 
legally recognised interests, the claimant is entitled to redress by the law (except 
if an injunction/interdict is sought: see Witting Street on torts (2015) 4–5 10–14 
with regard to English law; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 3, Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 1, Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 7–8 and Burchell Delict 9–10 
with regard to South African law). 
4 The English test for determining a duty of care in the tort of  
negligence and the recent approach to determining wrongfulness  
in the South African law of delict  
The tort of negligence in English law is recognised as the most important tort 
due to the large number of cases dealing generally with negligently inflicted 
harm
 that are brought before the courts (see Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort (2014) 78; Witting Street on torts 26). In English law, 
negligence from a South African perspective is not only a factor to be taken into 
account in determining liability in the tort of negligence but is also known as a 
distinct tort protecting a number of interests. The elements required to succeed 
with regard to the tort of negligence are: duty, breach, causation and damage or 
harm (see Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 
(2013) 99; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts (2014) 439 fn 1 
441; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 78; Witting Street on 
torts 25; Steele Tort law (2014) 112). In respect of the duty element, the claimant 
must prove that the defendant owed him or her a duty of care, that is, a duty to 
take reasonable care and not inflict harm upon him or her. The requirement of 
“duty of care” is a distinct essential element owed particularly to the claimant 
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(Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 80). The duty of care concept 
in English law is a preliminary question of law, demarcating the range of people, 
the type of relationships and the interests that should receive protection of the 
law as a result of negligent conduct. With regard to the breach of that duty; it is 
described as a factual question as to whether the defendant’s conduct strayed 
from the legally-required standard of care of the reasonable person (in other 
words, was his or her conduct negligent from a South African perspective, see 
Witting Street on torts 26; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 
31). The defendant’s breach of duty must have factually caused the harm or loss 
sustained by the claimant. The loss must not be unforeseeable or too remote or 
must be within the scope of the duty. There must be damage for liability in the 
tort of negligence to follow (see Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on 
torts 31, 441; Witting Street on torts 25; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 99). 
Turning to the duty of care, in practice, the claimant need only prove the 
existence of an acknowledged duty of care category and the general test for duty 
will only be necessary in novel duty categories or in cases where there is doubt 
as to the presence of a particular duty category. Specific categories of duties are 
recognised for inter alia omissions; psychiatric injury or mental harm; pure 
economic loss; wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life, once 
again, in respect of negligent conduct (see Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 441; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 102; Witting Street on torts 26–27).  
There are currently three approaches applied by the English courts in deter-
mining whether the defendant owes the claimant a general duty of care (see 
Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181 189–
190; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 87–89). They are known 
as the three-fold test, the incremental approach and the assumption of respon-
sibility test. With regard to the incremental approach, and acknowledging a novel 
duty of care, existing authority must be considered first and if there is a need for 
the law to be extended, it should be extended incrementally resulting in a 
positive development (Witting Street on torts 34). Stemming from the decision 
of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd 1964 AC 465, the court 
(House of Lords) acknowledged liability in the tort of negligence where the 
defendant voluntarily assumes responsibility for the accuracy of a statement 
made to a claimant and where the claimant relies on such statement. The phrase 
“assumption of responsibility” simply means that the law recognises the duty of 
care and assumption of responsibility may really just indicate proximity (see the 
explanation of this concept below). Where the assumption of responsibility is 
established, it is not necessary to consider the last element of the three-fold test 
(which is also explained in more detail below) as such a finding demonstrates the 
existence of a duty of care and the actual relationship between the parties makes 
it fair, just and reasonable to impose the duty of care (Customs and Excise 
Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181 199). The three-fold test is, 
however, the most common and preferred test used by the courts (see Van Colle 
v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police 2009 1 AC 225 260–261; Marc 
Rich & Co v Bishop Rock Marine 1996 AC 211 235). In Customs and Excise 
Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181 89–192 the court confirmed 
that the three-fold test may be combined with the incremental approach and the 
assumption of responsibility approach. 
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The three-fold test was enunciated in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 
AC 605 (“Caparo”), a case dealing with pure economic loss caused by alleged 
negligent misstatements (similar to the South African case, Telematrix where the 
recent approach to wrongfulness was enunciated). In Caparo, the court held 
(617–618 632–633) that the three elements that must be established in respect of 
a duty of care are foreseeability of harm; proximity and whether it is fair, just 
and reasonable to impose a duty of care. With regard to foreseeability of harm, 
specific harm to the claimant need not be foreseeable and it is sufficient if the 
claimant falls within the category of persons that could be reasonably foreseen to 
be injured as a result of the defendant’s negligence (see Jones in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 443–444; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 91). The concept of “proximity” encompasses different forms of close-
ness including physical, assumed, causal and circumstantial (Jones in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 447 450). Its use varies depending on the 
particular case and source of harm (Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 91–93). Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (Markesinis and Deakin’s tort 
law 113) submit that the “ambiguous term” of “proximity” generally refers to “a 
pre-tort relationship of some kind between the claimant and defendant arising 
prior to the infliction of damage”.  
The last test – whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care – 
requires further explanation. Jones (in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 
447 450) refers to this test as one of common sense, ordinary reason and whether 
it is right for the court to impose a duty of care in a given case. It also refers to 
the “exercise of judicial pragmatism, which is the same as judicial policy”. In a 
narrow sense, it relates to fairness and justice between the claimant and 
defendant. In a wider sense it relates to the reasonableness of imposing a duty of 
care based on legal (where the focus is on the legal system and principles) social 
and public policy (see idem 450–451; Alcock v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310 365).  
The third element of the three-fold test is generally used by the courts to reach 
a decision as to whether a duty of care should be imposed and whether a claim 
should be allowed. Witting Street on torts 48–50 points out that it is either used 
in a restrictive manner, to limit the scope of duty of care or in a positive manner, 
in recognising a duty where it was previously unrecognised or non-existent. An 
example of the court using the “fair, just and reasonable” element in a restrictive 
manner is illustrated in Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd 1996 
AC 211. In this case, a ship carrying the claimants’ cargo sustained a crack while 
on voyage. The ship docked at a port. A surveyor was employed by a classi-
fication society charged with checking the safety of ships at sea. The surveyor, 
upon inspection, recommended that the ship continue with its voyage after some 
minor repairs. A couple of days later the ship sank. The claimants’ recovered a 
certain amount of their loss from the ship owner and tried to recover the 
remainder of the loss from the classification society “alleging breach of a duty of 
care owed by the society to the cargo owners to take reasonable care in the 
surveys undertaken and the recommendations made so as not to expose the cargo 
to risk of damage or loss” (211–212). The House of Lords found that reasonable 
foreseeability of harm as well as proximity was present but that it was not fair, 
just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant. In concluding that 
it was not fair, just and reasonable to impose liability on the classification 
society, the House of Lords held inter alia that: the imposition of duty of care 
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may result in the classification societies refusing to inspect vessels which could 
result in compromising public safety at sea with detrimental consequences; 
increased litigation against such societies would occur and it would be a costly 
process diverting resources and “personnel” to the litigation process instead of 
focusing on the ships and saving lives; and that such recognition of a duty of care 
would be in conflict “with the international contractual structure” between ship 
and cargo owners (212 242).  
An example of the court using the “fair, just and reasonable” element in a 
positive manner is illustrated in White v Jones 1995 2 AC 207 (see the discussion 
of this case by Witting Street on torts 49–50). In this case, a legal practitioner did 
not draw up a new will as requested by the testator before his death, resulting in 
the testator’s daughters not inheriting. The House of Lords held that a duty of 
care should be imposed in such instances based on fairness, reasonableness and 
justice. Lord Goff (259–260) inter alia provided the following reasons: solicitors 
play an important role in discharging their professional duties relating to the 
testator’s intentions and if they act negligently in fulfilling their duties it is not 
unjust if such solicitor should be found liable, there is a lacuna in the law which 
needs to be filled; to deny a remedy to the disappointed beneficiary is unjust; the 
testator has a right to bequeath his assets to whom he pleases; and legacies are 
important in society. 
The majority of the duty of care cases have been established by taking account 
of two broad types of policy issues: whether certain types of harm, such as pure 
economic loss and psychiatric injury, can ground liability in the tort of 
negligence; and whether the duty of care can be imposed with respect to certain 
types of conduct by for example, public authorities’ and professionals (Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 49). Other policy factors considered 
under the element of whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of 
care include: the fear of indeterminate liability or the opening of the floodgates 
argument; vulnerability (to risk) of the claimant; whether a duty of care would 
undermine an imperative public interest; preference of protecting physical 
interests over pure economic loss or psychiatric injury; preference of protecting 
vulnerable victims such as the blind; the need to avoid conflict between claims in 
contract and in tort; the notion that people should be held accountable for their 
own actions; the desire to impose liability on primarily responsible parties such 
as regulatory authorities; and the notion that people should protect themselves 
from loss by taking out insurance or taking other precautionary measures (see 
Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 95–96; Witting Street on torts 
48).  
The last and third criterion has in a sense been adopted and adapted in our law 
as the recent approach. The difference is that in our law, the third criterion is 
used to establish wrongfulness instead of a duty of care. This criterion from an 
English perspective is also policy-based and has the effect of either excluding a 
duty of care or recognising a duty of care in terms of policy. It is useful in 
determining whether a duty of care exists in borderline, novel or difficult cases. 
Thus, it plays a prominent role in inter alia cases of omissions; wrongful 
conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims; psychiatric injury; and pure 
economic loss. It is an objective, flexible test enabling a value judgment as to 
whether the defendant owes the claimant a duty of care and allows the courts to 
rely on policy as well as principles of fairness, justice and reasonableness in 
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deciding whether to exclude or extend a category of duty of care in the tort of 
negligence.  
Harms JA in Telematrix (468) stated that our law should not adopt the English 
tort of negligence. He was faced with a case where it was not appropriate to use 
the breach of a legal duty to prevent harm approach in determining 
wrongfulness, he instead referred to policy considerations which would justify 
awarding compensation to the plaintiff (Neethling, Potgieter and Scott Casebook 
on the law of delict (2013) 100). Even though Harms JA did not intend to adopt 
the tort of negligence, as submitted earlier, with this recent approach, our law is 
closer to adopting it. Our Constitutional Court has also already endorsed this 
recent approach (see Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) 315; Lee v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 150; Country Cloud Trading v 
MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 8; Loureiro 
v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 525; DE v RH 
2015 5 SA 83 (CC) 101; H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 216). 
For example, Van der Westhuizen J in the Constitutional Court decision of 
Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd (2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 521 
referred to the boni mores as the test for wrongfulness enunciated in Minister van 
Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) but stated that now the boni mores takes on 
“constitutional contours” and are “by necessity underpinned and informed by the 
norms and values of our society, embodied in the Constitution”. Thus in essence 
the boni mores must consider and conform to the constitutional values. Van der 
Westhuizen J further stated that the wrongfulness enquiry 
“focuses on the conduct and goes to whether the policy and legal convictions of the 
community, constitutionally understood, regard it as acceptable. It is based on the 
duty not to cause harm − indeed to respect rights − and questions the reasonable-
ness of imposing liability” (525). 
With these words, Van der Westhuizen J effectively reconciled the traditional and the 
recent approaches. The recent approach is used in the end to justify the imposition of 
wrongfulness. Van der Westhuizen J (526) reasoned that there were sufficient public 
policy reasons for imposing liability and finding conduct as wrongful. 
It is evident that according to the recent approach, the courts do still consider the 
boni mores, constitutional values, policy considerations and the parties’ competing 
interests in deciding whether to impose liability upon the defendant (assuming all 
the other delictual elements are present). It is also evident that the recent approach 
seems to attach more weight to policy considerations. The recent approach to 
establishing wrongfulness was initially applied in instances of omissions and pure 
economic loss. However, it is no longer limited to instances of omissions and pure 
economic loss (see Scott 2014 De Jure 388–389). For example, in the recent 
decision of DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC) 101 the Constitutional Court in answering 
the question of whether our law still recognises adultery as a specific form of 
iniuria, concluded that public policy dictates that it is not reasonable to attach 
delictual liability to adultery. Thus adultery is no longer considered wrongful 
(105). The court’s decision was, however, influenced by the changing mores or 
softening of the attitude towards adultery. 
In H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 216 where the court was 
called upon to determine whether our law recognises a wrongful life claim, 
Froneman J stated that 
“our law has developed an explicitly normative approach to determining the 
wrongfulness element in our law of delict. It allows courts to question the 
AANTEKENINGE 145 
 
reasonableness of imposing liability . . . on grounds rooted in the Constitution, 
policy and legal convictions of the community . . . Part of the established 
wrongfulness enquiry is to determine whether there has been a breach of a legal 
duty not to harm the claimant, or whether there has been a breach of the claimant’s 
rights or interests”. 
Clearly the Constitutional Court has not done away with the traditional approach 
to determining wrongfulness but has actually just added another dimension or 
approach to determining wrongfulness.  
In South African law, it is has been suggested that the existence of a duty of 
care is similar to the element of wrongfulness and similar to the concept of a 
legal duty to prevent harm or loss as one of the tests for establishing 
wrongfulness (according to Fagan 2000 Acta Juridica 65, a legal duty to prevent 
harm and a duty of care are almost identical). South African courts have, 
however, stated that the duty of care concept is not part of South African law 
(Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; Local Transitional 
Council of Delmas v Boshoff 2005 5 SA 514 (SCA) 522; Telematrix 468; 
Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 3 SA 
138 (SCA) 144; Hawekwa Youth Camp v Byrne 2010 6 SA 83 (SCA) 90; 
Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 485–486; Administrateur Natal v Trust 
Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A) 833; McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent A 
Car v Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World Travel 2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 
559–561; Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure 
Development 2014 2 SA 214 (SCA) 222). In South African law, in determining 
wrongfulness, reasonable foreseeability of harm may be considered as a factor in 
determining whether there was a legal duty to prevent harm, but its role is small 
and controversial (see Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163 fn 222; Neethling and 
Potgieter 2014 TSAR 893–894. Even the relationship between the parties under 
the idea of proximity plays a role in determining whether there was a legal duty 
to prevent harm, but again the role is small (see in general Deacon v Planet 
Fitness 2016 2 SA 236 (GP) 242; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 60–78; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 116; Burchell Delict 40–45; McKerron The Law of 
delict (1971) 15–25 where the authors refer to a number of factors that may be 
considered in establishing the presence of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss, 
and there is no numerus clausus in respect of these factors). However, South 
African law has just adopted the third element of the English three-fold test (in 
determining a duty of care) in determining wrongfulness. 
5 Conclusion 
As shown above, the third element of the English three-fold test and the recent 
test for wrongfulness are strikingly similar. The three-fold test in English law 
was developed with regard to the tort of negligence, where negligent instead of 
intentional conduct was at the heart of the enquiry. There are specific intentional 
torts which deal with intentional conduct and there are a number of remedies and 
types of damages available in English law. Together, as a system, they no doubt 
work in harmony. Our courts have adopted this recent approach for all kinds of 
harm or loss and not necessarily only negligently inflicted harm or loss. The 
recent approach to determining wrongfulness, was an unnecessary approach 
adopted in South African law. The traditional approach was more than sufficient 
to deal with even novel and problematic cases. Nevertheless, the traditional 
approach to determining wrongfulness, is still followed in the South African law 
of delict next to the recent approach to determining wrongfulness, which is now 
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a part of our law. The two approaches are sometimes combined, with the recent 
approach applying as a final conclusion as to whether the defendant acted 
wrongfully. This approach is no doubt better than the recent approach applying 
on its own in determining wrongfulness. 
Now that the probability of the origin of the recent approach has been traced, 
our courts and writers should be very careful of the possible implications, in 
particular of adopting the tort of negligence. In borrowing tests and principles 
from English law we must be wary of adopting tests and principles that do not fit 
in with or are characteristic of our generalising approach. 
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